Abstract: Bilateral international tax treaties govern the host country taxation for the vast majority of the world's foreign direct investment (FDI). Of particular interest is the fact that the tax rates used under these treaties are gradually falling although the treaties themselves do not specify any such reductions. Since there is no outside governing agency to redress treaty violations, such reductions must be both mutually beneficial and self-enforcing. Furthermore, the optimal tax rates must be less than those initially set, otherwise no reductions would be necessary. To explain such behavior, we model a two-country setting with two-way capital flows. In particular, only part of FDI is immediately reversible. As the extent of irreversibility increases, the likelihood of Pareto optimal tax rates obtaining as a self-enforcing outcome in the initial period is reduced. More modest tax reductions, from the non-treaty levels, are still possible. These limited tax reductions generate an increase in bilateral FDI. As countries increase the stock of capital in one another, further reductions in taxes become self-enforcing. Depending on the extent of irreversibility and asymmetry, Pareto optimal tax rates may be obtainable in the long run. Thus, the amount of inbound investment a country can attract may be related to the commitment to which its outbound investment binds it. This final insight provides an additional rationale for the observed pattern of capital flows in which those countries with the greatest outbound capital flows are also those with the highest inbound flows.
I. Introduction
The use of dynamic tax incentives to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) is well known. The majority of economic studies examine the use of tax holidays in which a host government offers a firm an initial period of reduced tax rates after which taxes increase to their standard levels. While this is a powerful tool for attracting FDI, other types of tax incentives are also used. One of the most common alternative methods is the bilateral tax treaty. According to Radaelli (1997) international taxation is governed by a global network of nearly 2000 bilateral tax treaties. In 1998, such treaties with the U.S. covered approximately 78 percent of total U.S. investment abroad and 96 percent of FDI within the U.S. (BEA, 1998) . Similar to tax holidays, bilateral treaties are intended to promote investment between treaty partners, however they differ from tax holidays in two key respects. First, treaties are negotiated between two governments, not a government and a single firm. As such, they apply to all investment between the two countries. Second, rather than "front-loading" incentives as tax holidays do, treaty tax rates tend to gradually fall over time. While this difference in the timing of tax reductions is interesting in and of itself, what is particularly intriguing is that rather than a simple one-time, permanent reduction in taxes, treaty tax rates fall incrementally. Our goal is to offer one explanation for this gradual reduction in tax rates over time.
Key to our explanation is the irreversible nature of bilateral FDI. A treaty that specifies a large tax reduction, and thus a large inflow of irreversible FDI, may create more temptation than a country can resist. This leads the violator to tax the irreversible inbound investment heavily and to minimize outward investment so that it has less FDI trapped overseas which can be taxed in retribution. Alternatively, a small tax decrease can be self-enforcing for both countries. Since this tax reduction applies to both nations' investors, it increases FDI in both directions. Now, if a country deviates, it has more captive FDI in its partner, allowing the partner to exact a harsher punishment if a violation occurs. In this sense, outbound FDI acts as collateral. By linking the other country's tax to its own and committing this collateral, both countries gain credibility after the initial tax decrease which loosens the self-enforcement constraint. Thus, one reduction in tax rates makes additional reductions self-enforcing. Therefore, through gradual tax reductions, countries can approach an efficient allocation of capital even though they could not credibly commit to such a policy at the treaty's outset.
While tax treaties provide several avenues for FDI promotion, we will concentrate on their effect on withholding taxes. When a firm invests overseas, it typically does so through a subsidiary that repatriates profits to its parent through dividends, interest, and royalty payments.
Since these payments are a cost to the subsidiary, they are not taxable by the host country as part of the subsidiary's income. Nevertheless, most host governments capture part of this parent income through a withholding tax levied on the repatriation. For example, the standard, nontreaty U.S. withholding tax on dividends, interest payments, and royalties is 30 percent. Under a tax treaty, each government agrees to lower the withholding tax rates it applies to payments made to recipients who reside in the partner country. Specifically, tax treaties reduce withholding taxes by specifying maximum allowable tax rates. These maximum rates are as low as zero and are almost always identical for both treaty partners.
1 Similar to the tariff reductions specified in many bilateral and regional trade agreements (such as NAFTA, Mercosur, and the U.S.-Israel free trade agreement) reductions in taxes often occur incrementally. Some sequential tax reductions are specified by timetables written into the treaties themselves, while others are achieved through renegotiation. Table 1 provides examples of both types of sequential reductions. As Table 1 shows, the first U.S.-Canadian treaty was signed in 1941 and implemented a royalty withholding tax of 15 percent. This rate was lowered to 10 percent during renegotiations in the late 1970's.
According to the Price-Waterhouse Corporate Taxes: A World-Wide Summary, this tax was reduced to zero in 1997, although the treaty itself does not yet reflect this change. Additionally, the parental dividend tax fell from 15 to 10 to 5 percent over the same period.
TABLE 1 GOES APPROXIMATELY HERE
As stated in the introduction to the OECD's model tax treaty, the goal of a treaty is to "remove the obstacles that double taxation presents to the development of economic relations between countries" (OECD, 1997, pg. I-1) . Since reducing tax rates may mitigate the investment distortions due to tax policy, these reductions can be efficiency-improving. However, if lower tax rates are preferable, why are the lowest rates not chosen at the outset of the treaty? One answer is that they are not self-enforcing. Since there is no external body which can enforce tax treaties, a treaty must be self-enforcing as well as mutually beneficial.
When only a portion of FDI is immediately reversible, the set of self-enforcing tax rates at any point in time is dependent upon the current investment levels each country has in the other.
This irreversibility can represent the time to dismantle or sell off assets, the effort of training immobile factors of production such as foreign workers, or the cost of tailoring production to the overseas market. The interdependence between FDI and self-enforcing tax rates arises from the vulnerability of outbound FDI. If a country has a relatively large amount of overseas investment,
this leaves it open to a relatively harsh punishment should it deviate from a treaty. Additionally, when FDI is less reversible, this increases the length of the punishment phase in which the other country can implement a punitively high tax rate. These two effects imply that a country with a relatively large amount of outbound FDI is less likely to deviate from a tax treaty and will find a larger set of tax rates to be self-enforcing. A further implication is that a reduction in tax rates in the current period increases the current amount of outbound FDI, which expands the following period's set of self-enforcing tax rates. This suggests that initially unattainable tax rates may be achieved through gradual tax reductions. An alternative interpretation of this result is especially interesting for developing countries. These countries often seek inbound FDI as an engine of growth while simultaneously imposing capital controls to reduce outbound FDI. Our argument would indicate that in order to attract inbound investment, a country might also need to encourage outbound investment in order to establish a credible reputation as a stable host for FDI.
We formalize the above argument by presenting a model of two countries with bilateral FDI. Without a treaty, governments cannot credibly commit to the efficient tax rates, resulting in an inefficient equilibrium with high tax rates and low levels of FDI. A tax treaty improves on this outcome by allowing governments to coordinate on a pair of Pareto improving tax rates. Because of the initially low levels of FDI, Pareto-optimal tax rates may not be self-enforcing at the outset of the treaty. Despite this, as long as investment is not entirely irreversible and governments care sufficiently about the future, some Pareto improving tax reduction is credible. This leads to a small increase in FDI and expands the set of self-enforcing tax rates. This makes additional tax reductions possible and implies that through gradually falling tax rates countries can achieve mutually beneficial tax rates which were not sustainable in the early stages of the treaty. If countries are sufficiently asymmetric or if investment is sufficiently irreversible, then there will exist an inefficient limit to the tax reductions, however, this cooperative outcome is still a Pareto improvement over the non-treaty equilibrium.
Although we are unaware of any work studying gradualism in tax treaties, there are obvious parallels between this gradualism and that found for tariffs under self-enforcing trade agreements. A common approach in the literature on gradualism in trade agreements is to focus on changes in endogenous government policies as a state variable evolves. Staiger (1995) , for example, links gradually falling tariffs to rent-earning factors that are displaced by trade liberalization and, therefore, present a barrier to complete elimination of tariffs. Since a small decrease in tariffs displaces only a small percentage of factors in the import competing industry, small tariff reductions are easiest to implement. Furthermore, these displaced workers lose their rent-earning skill with some exogenous probability, which in turn eliminates their resistance to further tariff reductions. Thus, trade liberalization occurs through multiple rounds of negotiations. In a related vein, Furusawa and Lai (1998) show that gradualism can arise if there are adjustment costs to moving workers in and out of the import-competing sector. In contrast to these two approaches, we adopt the common tax literature convention of sector-specific, constant capital stocks, which closes these avenues for gradualism. Devereux (1997) demonstrates that as a result of learning by doing, the gains from specialization and the degree of comparative advantage can increase over time. Therefore, as the cost of a trade war evolves, tariffs can gradually fall. In our more simplistic setting, technology and production costs are assumed to be constant over time, prohibiting this effect. Using an approach similar to ours, Chisik (2000) considers the role of irreversibility in the export sector in determining self-enforcing trade agreements. He finds that an initial reduction in tariffs leads to an increase in country-specific export capacity. This increase in capacity increases the cost of a trade war and makes further tariff reductions possible. This idea of partner-specificity is particularly appealing for FDI, since by the nature of its physical location, it is partner-specific.
2
As noted above, tax treaties and tax holidays differ in both the negotiating parties (government-government versus government-firm) and the timing of tax reductions. Despite the difficulty of translating the results from one policy instrument to the other, it is important to draw what parallels we can. Thomas and Worrell (1994) consider a case in which a host government is unable to credibly commit to not expropriate its inbound FDI, which leads to inefficiently low levels of investment. In spite of this, it is incentive compatible for the host country to offer the firm a tax holiday in early periods (i.e. not expropriate the investment) to induce additional investment which it can tax later on. As opposed to our framework with two host governments and bi-directional FDI they consider a single host and a single investor. In their unidirectional framework the only possible punishment to a host that breaks the agreement and expropriates the investment is the withholding of further investment. For this reason, the tax treaty is backloaded:
2 A somewhat different tack is taken by Bond and Park (2000) , who find gradualism as a symptom of timeinconsistency in tariff setting by a large country who trades with a small country. Here, gradualism occurs because the small country desires to smooth consumption over time. In order to smooth that country's consumption, the trade agreement may stipulate high tariffs in early periods and low tariffs with greater side payments to the large country in later periods. Because we assume that governments maximize the present value of national income, there is no gain from income smoothing and our result is not driven by this motivation. Aizenman (1996) Other work on tax holidays also views them as a symptom of a host government's inability to commit to low tax rates on inbound FDI in an unidirectional framework. Conway (1985) and Doyle and Van Wijnbergen (1994) consider settings with irreversible investment in which a government and a firm bargain sequentially over tax rates. Once the firm has undertaken the investment, this shifts additional bargaining power to the government who then negotiates higher tax rates in the following period. Thus the initially low tax rates are the result of the government's inability to commit to a path of low tax rates and the equilibrium is characterized by inefficiently low amounts of FDI. show that despite these inefficiencies a host may not prefer to commit (even if it could) because this eliminates its ability to renegotiate in the following period. In a similar model, Eaton and Gersovitz (1984) suggest that when a country would prefer to commit but cannot, the threat of punishment by a foreign country can improve a country's credibility and raise its welfare. We formalize this idea by explicitly considering how the foreign punishment endogenously evolves in the context of tax treaties.
managed trade. He finds that since FDI is a substitute for exports, FDI can reduce the time inconsistency problem in trade negotiations. 3 Bond and Samuelson (1986) consider an uncertain environment in which two countries with private information about a country-specific productivity parameter compete for FDI. They find that the country with the higher productivity can signal this private information to the firm by offering a longer-lasting tax holiday. In contrast, our model is completely deterministic and has perfect information, leaving no role for signaling. Again, our argument is based on the linkages between governments' tax rates, not on the incentive-compatible level of unilaterally determined taxes.
We proceed as follows. The next section presents the model and derives the equilibrium without a tax treaty. Section III introduces tax treaties and discusses their implications for the path of tax rates over time. Section IV considers asymmetries between the treaty partners.
Section V concludes.
II. A Simple Model of Bilateral FDI and Taxation

A. Investors
Consider two countries, home and foreign, each of which are endowed with inelastic capital stocks, K and K * , respectively. 4 In each period, investors can invest either at home or overseas. The amount of home (foreign) FDI in foreign (home) during period t is denoted Z t (Z t * ). Home capital that remains at home is used to produce a good according to the production function h(K-Z t ). Home capital located in foreign produces the same good using the production function h s (Z t ). The price of this good is constant and normalized to one. Both production functions satisfy the Inada conditions and are increasing and strictly concave in capital.
Investment irreversibility is captured by γ ∈ [0, 1] and the constraint that Z t ≥ γZ t-1 . If γ = 0, then all FDI is immediately reversible. If γ = 1, it is impossible to recall overseas investment. The irreversibility parameter is exogenous. 5 Similarly, foreign investors split their capital between foreign production, f(K * -Z t * ), and production in the home country, f s (Z t * ), under analogous assumptions regarding the behavior of the production functions and irreversibility. 6 The price of the foreign good is also inelastic and equal to one. It is important to note that there is no substitutability between the home and foreign capital stocks, indicating that capital is specific to the good produced by each country. This would be the case if the differentiated products embody 4 Alternatively, we could permit capital to grow at some exogenous rate. This makes FDI more attractive over time, but does not change the intuition regarding the role of irreversibility. Therefore, for the sake of brevity, we retain the assumption of fixed capital stocks. 5 Although we make the irreversibility parameter exogenous, this need not be true in practice. For example it may be possible for investors to choose alternative technologies or split their investment between easilyreversible portfolio investment and less reversible direct investment. While this case is highly intriguing, given the complexity of the current model we leave this extension to future research.
proprietary technology, patents, brand names or country-of-origin reputations. 7 According to Caves (1996) , these are common features of multinational corporations.
FIGURE 1 GOES APPROXIMATELY HERE
The timing of the model is summarized in Figure 1 . At the beginning of each period governments simultaneously announce tax rates to domestic and overseas investors. Although it is not necessary for our results, we permit governments the ability to announce different tax rates to each group of investors. Thus, it is possible for a government to warn its investors in advance of a planned deviation from the cooperative treaty tax rates. 8 Such a warning could be an explicit signal to investors, or it could simply be the result of home investors being more knowledgeable about the political climate in the home country than are the relatively distant foreign investors.
The home (foreign) government's announced tax rate to the home (foreign) investors in period t is A*A tt () ττ . The home (foreign) government's announced tax rate to foreign (home) investors is a*a tt () ττ . Although we permit the possibility, we show below that neither government will announce anything other than the cooperative tax rate to overseas investors. Following tax rate announcements, investors simultaneously commit capital allocations for the period (subject to their irreversibility constraints). After capital allocations are made and observed by both governments, both countries set actual tax rates * tt (,) ττ and production values are realized. 9 The ability to revise tax rates from their announced levels implies that tax rates can be changed faster 6 For now we assume that γ = γ * to conserve on notation. We explicitly consider the case in which γ ≠ γ * in section IV.C. below. 7 As Markusen and Venables (1998) show, such two-way capital flows can arise even between identical countries in a differentiated products industry. 8 The ability to notify one's own investors before a deviation allows the deviating country to begin reducing its FDI earlier than the surprised country. We believe that this possibility for coordination between the government and its own investors is the more natural case to consider. On the other hand, if governments do not (or cannot) warn their own investors, then no investors can respond until the period following the deviation. In Appendix B, we analyze when the government would choose not to inform their own investors and we show that gradualism still occurs. 9 This timing is similar to that used by Lapan (1988) , McLaren (1997) and Bond and Park (1998) in their discussion of trade agreements. As in those studies, this timing creates the potential for time inconsistency in government policy. The important difference, here, is that bilateral investment irreversibility can mitigate the time inconsistency problem. than investment decisions. Given the observed efficiency of most governments, this is perhaps the most fanciful of our assumptions.
Home investors maximize the present value of lifetime profits by choosing a stream of FDI. These profits, where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor and E(τ t * ) is the expected foreign tax rate in time t, are given by:
10,11,12 tt t*t*s ttt t1t1
The irreversibility constraint requires that:
Investors are forward-looking and allocate their capital taking into account both expected changes in future tax rates and how their decisions affect government actions (such as deviations from a treaty). As shown below, if foreign taxes are not expected to increase in the future, (2) is non-binding. With this in mind, as long as the expected foreign tax rate is less than one, the home investor will pick a positive level of investment, Z(K, E(τ t *)) whic h equates the domestic and overseas after-tax rates of return. 13 This yields the home capital market equilibrium condition in period t:
10 Although our model is completely deterministic, investor's decisions in the current period take into account their expectation of future tax rates. Thus, E(τ * t ) is the anticipated future foreign tax rate which is conditional on the current period's history rather than on some stochastic process. 11 Note that home investors pay no home tax. Since the home government has no incentive to distort home investor decisions, this is optimal from the home government's perspective. As long as the home government can set discriminatory taxes on foreign investors operating within its borders, such an optimum is obtainable. Hines (1988) and Hufbauer (1992) provide evidence of such discrimination. 12 Equation (1) indicates that profits are repatriated at the end of the period in which they are earned. Since production is a function only of capital which is inelastically supplied, there is no incentive for the subsidiary to retain its earnings. Hartman (1985) considers a case in which a subsidiary can be financed either through retained earnings or capital flows from the parent. Because retained earnings avoid withholding taxes, this represents a cheaper form of finance than parent equity. Thus, Hartman suggests that withholding taxes will only influence the behavior of mature, i.e. non-expanding, subsidiaries. If taxes do not influence FDI, then there would be little reason to negotiate a treaty. Therefore, we have chosen what we feel is the simplest model of subsidiary finance in which taxes affect FDI. 13 Naturally, along the equilibrium path this expected future tax will be self-enforcing since if it were not, future tax rates would be expected to rise.
If taxes are expected to rise at some point in the future, then a condition similar to (3) can be derived. Since efficiency-improving tax treaties will exhibit non-increasing tax rates, this result is not presented.
14 An interior solution to equation (3) yields to the following comparative statics (suppressing the arguments of functions):
Blonigen and Davies (2000) find empirical evidence of a negative relationship between withholding taxes and FDI for inbound U.S. investment. This result indicates that as long as tax rates do not rise in the future, investors will not choose to retract investment, implying that the irreversibility constraint is non-binding. Blonigen and Davies, Brainard (1997) , and others have found a positive correlation between FDI and a country's available funds.
Given the similarities between the home and foreign investors, if home taxes are not expected to rise in the future, then an interior equilibrium in the foreign capital market in period t is given by:
A comparable set of comparative statics can be derived.
B. Governments
Each government chooses its tax rate in each period to maximize the present value of its national income subject to the capital market equilibrium conditions (3) and (6), irreversibility constraints (2), and investor expectations. Denote the actual home and foreign tax rates in each period by τ t and τ t * . Tax rates are constrained to the unit interval. Governments share the same discount rate as investors. This implies that home and foreign national incomes are: 15 tt***t*ss* tttttttttt t1t1t1
and t*t***t**s**s tttttttttt t1t1t1
As equations (7) and (8) indicate, taxes merely redistribute income from one country to another.
Thus world income in each period is maximized when tax rates are zero. Define these optimum FDI levels as Z opt = Z(K, 0) and Z *opt = Z * (K * , 0). As we show in Proposition 1 below, these optimal investment levels and the maximization of world income cannot be obtained without a tax treaty.
C. Equilibrium in the Absence of a Tax Treaty
As a benchmark case, consider the equilibrium that arises in the absence of a tax treaty.
Without a tax treaty, governments do not condition their action on history and choose myopically optimal tax rates based solely on the current period FDI levels. These Markov strategies yield a particularly stark outcome. Because FDI is fixed in the third stage of every period, the best response for both governments is to fully tax away the profits on any inbound FDI. Correctly forecasting this third stage outcome, investors do not add any FDI in the second stage. As a result of this time inconsistency problem, the government's announced tax rate in the first stage is noncredible and immaterial in the resulting equilibrium. Furthermore, because no FDI is added, the physical environment does not change in the following period and the same inefficient outcome is obtained. A subgame-perfect equilibrium in these Markov strategies is a Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE). It is the unique equilibrium in the absence of a tax treaty and it is described in Proposition 1. Proof: Consider the home country in an arbitrary period t. Their optimal choice of τ t in the third stage of period t maximizes (7). The first order condition for τ t is:
Note that Z t * is fixed in stage three, therefore, ∂ Z t * /∂τ t = 0. This implies that home will set its tax rate as high as possible, i.e. τ t = 1. Knowing this, foreign investors will minimize FDI, indicating that Z t * = Max {0, γZ * t-1 }. It is straightforward to verify that this is the only equilibrium.
Similarly we can show that τ t * =1 is optimal for the foreign country implying that Z t = Max {0, γZ t-1 }. Finally note that the above result holds for any period t.
The first part of Proposition 1 shows that without a tax treaty no FDI occurs. Part b of the proposition is a direct extension of part a. It indicates that if an existing tax treaty is ever voided and nations return to competitively set tax rates, then the unique outcome is similar to the 16 Alternative assumptions on belief structures, irreversibility, or timing can temper severity of the nontreaty tax rates. Conway (1985) , , Doyle and Van Wijnbergen (1994) , and Thomas and Worrall (1994) demonstrate the existence of positive FDI equilibria even without a tax treaty. When the host government does not hold all the bargaining power after investment occurs, their gain from continued future investment can outweigh their gain from short-term exp ropriation. This desire for reputation provides credibility to an announced tax rate less than one. It will still be the case, however, that investment is inefficiently low, leaving room for a tax treaty. Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast (1994) provide a fascinating historical analysis of how medieval merchant guilds provided the multilateral reputation incentives that reduced the desire to fully tax away the profits on any inbound FDI. Incorporating this initial unilateral FDI would not change our main result that increases in bilateral FDI can generate lower tax rates, however, it can alter the initial dynamic of a tax treaty. (See footnote 18 below.) Alternatively, as Eaton and Gersovitz (1984) point out, credibility can be gained through side agreements such as a trade treaties. These provide an avenue for punishment similar to the one we discuss.
austere no-treaty outcome: taxes are set at their maximal level, and investors remove FDI as fast as the irreversibility constraint will permit. Since the equilibrium without a tax treaty is clearly inefficient, we now depart from this benchmark case to consider the role of tax treaties in ameliorating this dire equilibrium.
III. Gradualism in Cooperative Tax Rates
An efficiency-improving tax treaty specifies a path of tax rates an international enforcement agency, we concentrate on those treaties which are self-enforcing in each period. We also assume that the only instrument that each government has at its disposal is its tax rate. 17 Finally, since almost all treaties specify identical withholding taxes for both treaty partners, we impose the additional constraint that both countries levy the same tax rate, τ t . This constraint will not be binding in the symmetric case considered in section III. In section IV we consider asymmetries between the treaty partners and show how these differences, coupled with the same tax rate constraint, can affect the treaty outcome.
A. Tax-Treaty Strategies
A common form of self-enforcing mechanism relies upon "grim" strategies which mandate that any deviation from the specified cooperative action generates an infinite reversion to a punishment stage. A credible punishment threat relies upon continuation payoffs from a perfect equilibrium (often the most undesirable static Nash equilibrium). ZZ + =γ otherwise.
These tax-treaty strategies are straightforward. If the tax treaty has been adhered to in the past, and if it appears that the foreign country intends to adhere to it in the current period, then the home country sets the current period taxes according to the tax treaty. After any other history they abandon the treaty. Investors have similar strategies. If there have been no deviations in the past and there is no indication that either government intends to deviate from the treaty in the 18 For early examples of such punishments in dynamic games with an evolving state variable, see papers by Ausubel and Deneckere (1987) , Cave (1987) and Radner and Benhabib (1992) . 19 A self-enforcing, individually-rational treaty requires that the payoff to the treaty exceeds not only the payoff to deviating, but also the payoff to not entering the treaty in the first place. Under our assumption of no initial FDI (see footnote 15), any incentive-compatible treaty is also individually rational. Under alternative assumptions, the non-treaty equilibrium still requires high positive tax rates, however, they need not equal one. The initial self-enforcing tax rates analyzed in Propositions 2, 3 and 4 may, therefore, current period, then home investors invest according to the expected treaty tax rate. Similar taxtreaty strategies can be described for the foreign country. In the presentation that follows we focus, without loss of generality, on the incentives of the home country.
The foreign government may inadvertently be alerted to a deviation in period d in two ways. First, if home announces something other than c d
τ to the foreign country and home investors, all agents correctly anticipate both that τ d = 1 and that the agreement will collapse in period d+1. This leads home and foreign investors to immediately begin reducing their FDI and causes the foreign government to break from their announcement and set τ d * = 1. Since such a move by home reduces both their overseas profits in the deviation period and their tax revenues, this is clearly not an optimal strategy on home's part. Therefore, the home country will always announce the cooperative tax to foreign investors.
Second, if the home government informs home investors of a planned deviation, then the tax-treaty strategies indicate that the home investors would choose to reduce investment and inadvertently signal this deviation to the foreign country. At first glance, it may not appear obvious that this information revelation is in the best interests of the home investors. If home investors ignore the announcement, they will maintain the cooperative foreign tax for period d.
This, however, implies a greater amount of trapped FDI which increases future losses. Therefore, home investors will only tip off the foreign government if the costs outweigh the benefit, i.e. if:
where Z d and Z d-1 are functions of the expected cooperative tax rates. We show in Appendix B that because home's national income is the sum of home investors' profits and tax revenues from inbound FDI, equation (10) is also the necessary and sufficient condition for the home government to choose to announce its deviation to its investors. Hence, the optimal action for exceed the non-treaty rates and fail to be individually rational. As Proposition 5 suggests, this may be a particular difficulty for highly asymmetric countries.
domestic investors is to terminate cooperative behavior whenever the announced tax rate is not the cooperative rate. We show in Appendix B that equation (10) is more likely to be satisfied if the degree of irreversibility and/or the discount rate is larger. Since our main result shows that gradualism occurs if the degree of irreversibility is sufficiently large, we proceed under the assumption that equation (10) holds, implying that the home government will forewarn its investors of a planned deviation, and defer the alternative case to Appendix B. There, we show that if (10) does not hold or if governments cannot forewarn their investors at all, then this can only reduce the magnitude of tax reductions which strengthens our gradualism result.
B. Tax-Treaty Payoffs
Whether or not equation (10) 
If both countries abide by the tax-treaty, then the home country's payoff in period t is: c*c*cc*csccs*c tttttttt
As a direct corollary of Proposition 1, we know that the optimal tax for a deviating home government is τ d = 1. Using this fact and equation (11), the home country's payoff from a period d deviation is given by:
From equation (11), Proposition 1, and the tax-treaty strategies, the home country's payoff in each period after their period d deviation can be written as:
wd*cctd1cstd*c td1dd1d
II(K,K,,Z,)h(KZ)f(Z)
The gain to deviating from the tax treaty in period d can then be succinctly expressed as:
Similarly, the cost of deviating from the tax treaty in period d can be written as:
Ψ d * and Ω d * are defined similarly. A self-enforcing cooperative tax path must be such that the cost of deviation outweighs its benefits. This gives the following incentive compatibility constraints:
Under the restriction that countries set identical cooperative tax rates, both equations in In the next sub-section we show that there exists a connected set of self-enforcing tax rates in the initial period which Pareto dominate (are lower than) the non-cooperative tax rates.
We also show that if the extent of irreversibility is large enough, then even the lowest of these initial tax rates are inefficiently high, indicating that further reductions are desirable. Finally we show that the increase in FDI generated by this initial tax reduction creates slack in the incentive constraint which makes further tax-reductions self-enforcing.
C. The Main Results in the Symmetric Case
The first question we ask is whether Pareto optimal tax rates are immediately obtainable.
This would correspond to the tax path c*c tt 0 τ=τ= being self-enforcing for all t. If there is no irreversibility (i.e. γ = 0) and if home and foreign are symmetric, then our setting is equivalent to a repeated game and the standard folk theorem results obtain, i.e. that this outcome occurs for a discount factor close to one. 21 As shown in the following proposition, irreversibility limits the set of initially self-enforcing outcomes so that if the extent of irreversibility is sufficiently large, then the standard result can not arise. (1). 20 We present results suggesting which country's incentive constraint will bind in section IV.C. 21 We show in Proposition 5 below that the symmetric case presents the easiest case for Pareto optimal taxes to be obtained and that they may not ever be obtained in the asymmetric case. Proposition 2, therefore, considers the easiest case for Pareto optimal taxes to obtain immediately. 
(a.) Suppose that c*c tt 0 τ=τ= for all t is self-enforcing. Writing the incentive constraint in the first period of the tax treaty, we must have:
Now, when γ approaches 1, the second bracketed term approaches zero. The first bracketed term is strictly negative for all t, therefore, equation (16) is not satisfied.
(b.) Differentiating both sides of equation (15) In interpreting the sign of ∂Ω 1 /∂δ, first note that Ω 1 must be positive in any self-enforcing agreement, therefore, the bracketed term must be positive in some time period. Second, the bracketed expression is not decreasing over time (and is strictly increasing in future periods if either γ < 1 or if future tax reductions are expected.) An increase in the discount factor shifts weight to these future periods.
Referring to Figure 3 we see how changes in γ and δ shift the Ω 1 curve and, therefore, how the lowest self-enforcing tax rate, c 1 τ is affected by changes in these parameters.
(c.) From equation (16) Hence, an increase in γ requires an increase in δ in order for the incentive constraint to be satisfied in the initial period.
FIGURES 3 AND 4 GO APPROXIMATELY HERE
The idea behind Proposition 2 is that when FDI is irreversible (or almost so), the costs to deviation are small since reductions in inbound FDI are slow to happen. Alternatively, if there is no irreversibility, then a standard folk-theorem-type result is produced. Increasing the extent of irreversibility from its minimal level in turn has a monotonic effect on the critical discount factor necessary for Pareto optimal taxes to occur in the initial period of the tax treaty. We assume in what follows that governments are sufficiently short-lived so that their discount factor does not exceed the critical level. We show in the next proposition that, despite this difficulty, some cooperative tax rate less than one is self-enforcing. This tax reduction, in turn, generates the irreversible FDI that permits further tax reductions. Proof: To show that some tax reduction is possible we start by assuming that no tax reduction is ever possible and establish a contradiction. In this case, taxes are set a constant level cc*c*c t1t11
τ=τ=τ=τ=τ for all t. Substituting this constant tax rate into equation (15), totally differentiating the resulting expression with respect to τ 1 , using an envelope result for the optimality of Z, and simplifying, yields:
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Taking the limit of the above derivative as τ 1 → 1 from below and remembering from equation (3) that c*c* 11
as long as δ is positive and γ is less than one. As established above Ω Ψ Ω Ψ τ sufficiently close to one. A similar result holds for the foreign country's incentive constraint.
Hence, there exists a pair of self-enforcing first-period taxes that are strictly less than one as long as both nations place some weight on the future and investment is not completely irreversible.
This result is summarized in Figure 2 , where c 1 τ represents the lowest tax rate for which home is willing to maintain the agreement.
We now show that after this initial tax reduction to c 1 τ further tax cuts become possible.
From equation (4) we know that Z 1 increases along with the reduction in c 1 τ . We see the effect of Z 1 on the incentive constraint in period 2 by differentiating equations (12-14):
Equation (19) shows that the increase in Z d-1 creates slack in the period d incentive constraint. As shown in Figure ( 4) this slack can be taken up by a lower period d tax rate. Since the first-period tax reduction generates positive FDI for both countries, slack is introduced into the foreign incentive constraint as well. A reduction is, therefore, produced in the lowest mutually selfenforcing tax rate:
Thus, as long as countries care about the future and investment is at least partially reversible, some Pareto improving tax reduction is possible. Furthermore, this initial tax cut increases each country's ability to commit to future tax reductions since it increases the cost of deviating from the tax treaty. Therefore, through gradual tax reductions, Pareto superior tax pairs can be obtained that are not initially self-enforcing. Note that this cooperative tax path is not unique. There exists a continuum of less efficient tax rates between c t τ and 1 which are also selfenforcing, however, we feel it is natural to expect that the treaty would pick the lowest mutually self-enforcing tax rate in each period.
IV. Asymmetries
A. Gradualism in the Asymmetric Case
We start by showing that our main result also holds in the asymmetric case. 
Proof:
The proof of Proposition 4 is almost identical to that of Proposition 3. We only discuss the few differences here. The incentive constraint for the first period of the tax treaty, in the nonsymmetric case, can be written as follows: t1c*csccs*cs*t*c 11ttttt1 t2
We are still interested in examining the behavior of this constraint as tax rates approach 1. The derivative of this expression with respect to the common tax rate is:
*c*c s*cscs*ct1s*t1*c 1111 111k1k1 t1 111
It is straightforward to verify that under symmetry equation (21) becomes equal to equation (17).
In any case, because c*c* 11 (21) still results in equation (18) Because of the conventions of tax treaties in practice, we restrict attention to agreements in which taxes are identical between countries. In the asymmetric case, this means that one nation's incentive compatibility constraint may remain slack. Thus, there may exist Pareto preferred tax reductions whereby both equations in (14) hold with equality. Given this source of potential inefficiency we next ask what outcomes are obtainable when treaties are restricted to a common tax rate.
B. Attainable Outcomes
We now examine the limit of this gradual tax-reduction path and ask if the Pareto efficient tax rate pair {0,0} is ever self-enforcing. Consider, then, the home country's welfare along the cooperative path as given by *c*c tt I(K,K,,) ττ . Differentiating this expression with respect to the common tax rate τ t and again using the envelope result for optimal FDI at an interior equilibrium (equation (3)) we have:
c*c scs*cs*c tt tttt tt
In the symmetric case, scs*c tt h(Z)f(Z) = , and the above derivative is negative, for any positive tax rate, therefore, further movements in the common tax rate towards zero are always Pareto improving. Performing the same analysis for the foreign country we see that, in the symmetric case, both countries would agree to all self-enforcing tax reductions until taxes reach the efficient level. On the other hand, consider the case in which h s (⋅) is zero. Now equation (22) As an alternative to side payments, we can consider asymmetric taxes. In particular, although equal tax reductions below τ min are not welfare improving for a small home country, a small tax reduction by the home country coupled with a large foreign tax reduction may improve home welfare. Because f s (⋅) is much larger than h s (⋅) in the asymmetric case we have been considering, this tax cut can improve foreign country welfare as well. Despite this, unless the foreign country chooses negative (and also distortionary) taxes the home country will never agree to zero taxes, implying that fully efficient FDI flows are still unattainable. Although of theoretical interest, asymmetric tax rates are rarely encountered in real-world tax treaties. 24 As our main focus is on characterizing existing tax agreements we leave for further research the objective of specifying optimal tax reduction paths for asymmetric countries.
C. Comparative Statics and Asymmetries.
Although our results hold for both symmetric and asymmetric countries, it is instructive to consider how differences in γ and K between the two countries influences the path of selfenforcing tax rates. The first of these results is contained in the following proposition. In Appendix B we provide an alternative proof of Proposition 5 and also show how the constraint implied by equation (10) may limit the possibility of Pareto optimal taxes obtaining for symmetric countries if the discount factor is sufficiently small. 24 One example of this is the U.S. treaty with Pakistan. While Pakistani firms enjoy reduced withholding tax rates in the U.S., U.S. firms do not receive preferential withholding taxes in Pakistan. They do, however, benefit from increased coordination in tax laws. An alternative type of asymmetry arises when countries differ in their capital stocks.
Starting with identical countries, suppose that there is a one-time permanent increase in the home's capital stock, so that K > K * . This increases the attractiveness of FDI for home (recall that ∂Z t /∂K > 0 from equation 5). The effect on home's incentive constraint is given by (where we again use the envelope result for the optimality of home's FDI):
which implies that home's incentive constraint loosens. Put simply, with an increase in its capital stock, home finds that FDI is more profitable and will prefer to encourage it even more than it currently does. This is not always the case for the now relatively small foreign country. The total effect on foreign's incentive constraint, again holding taxes constant, is Honduras, which had practically zero FDI in the U.S., felt that all of the gains from the treaty were accruing to the Americans (Diamond and Diamond, 1998) .
V. Conclusions
Before concluding, it is useful to cast our model in a different light by reinterpreting tax rates as probabilities of expropriation. Although none of our results change, this does suggest an intriguing line of thought. The key to tax reductions is the existence of bilateral flows since it is only through bilateral investment that countries can punish one another after "inhospitable"
behavior. As the BEA's (1998) data shows, the largest hosts for U.S. investment also send the most FDI to the U.S.. While this is undoubtedly due in part to their larger, wealthier economies, our results suggest that it may also arise from greater bilateral integration which leads to mutually lower expropriation risks. Developing nations have long sought out FDI as a tool for growth and expend a great deal of effort to attract foreign investors. At the same time, some nations also implement capital controls to prevent capital outflows from hollowing-out domestic production.
Our model, however, suggests that in order to promote inbound investment, it may also be necessary to encourage outbound investment. This mirrors the export promotion advice discussed in the development literature (Pack, 1989) , although it occurs from changes in the time inconsistency problem rather than comparative advantage. Naturally, we do not claim that in order to promote inbound FDI developing nations should abandon all restrictions on capital outflows, however this is an exciting interpretation that we leave to future researchers to explore more fully.
In summary, we have considered one facet of bilateral tax treaties on FDI, which rank among the most common investment promotion tools. We find that bilateral tax treaties can indeed increase FDI and improve the global allocation of capital relative to the non-treaty outcome. Furthermore, when governments are unable to commit to their tax policies, we find that in some cases Pareto efficient tax rates can only be obtained when taxes are gradually reduced.
Even in those situations for which globally optimal tax rates are not self-enforcing, we find that some improvements over the non-treaty equilibrium are still obtainable. This suggests that, much like international trade agreements, tax treaties are a powerful tool for increasing world welfare.
APPENDIX A:
The Shape of the Incentive Constraint.
In this appendix we establish the shape of the incentive constraint. We do this in three parts. First, for τ < 1, in the asymmetric case, 
